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The Changing Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
Geoffrey R. Watson*
Happy Birthday, ICTY! I remember the birth of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia quite well because I was in
the room for the big event. A guest of the U.S. delegation, I sat behind
U.S. Representative Madeleine K. Albright in May, 1993, as she negotiated
and voted for the establishment of the first international war crimes tribunal
since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. (That's me behind Secretary
Albright in the CNN file footage, rocking from side to side like an
expectant father, straining to get a better look at the proceedings.) Like any
birth, this one had its share of labor pains, and like any newborn, this one a piece of paper, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal - was an
almost weightless little bundle, lacking definition but full of promise.
How the little one has grown! The Tribunal now employs over a
thousand people, and its annual budget exceeds $200 million.' As of this
writing, thirty-four defendants have been tried for violations of the
Tribunal's Statute, of whom sixteen have been convicted and sentenced,
another twelve have been convicted and are currently appealing their
convictions, another one has just been convicted but not yet appealed, and
five have been acquitted. Eight other defendants, including former Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic, are currently being tried for various
violations of international criminal law. Forty-five accused, including

. Visiting Professor of Law, The George Washington University; Professor of Law, The
Catholic University of America.
1. See Ninth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 14 August 2002, A/57/150, available
at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2002/index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2003); see also
U.N.G.A. Res. 56/247B (2002) (approving a revised budget of more than $248 million
gross, or $223 million net, for 2002-03).
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Milosevic, are currently imprisoned in the Tribunal's Detention Unit.2 The
perceived success of the ICTY, and that of its sister tribunal, the
Rwanda, helped pave the way for the
International Criminal Tribunal for
3
new International Criminal Court.
During its ten-year existence, the ICTY has produced an impressive
body of jurisprudence on international humanitarian law and international
criminal procedure. Its most important jurisprudential achievement has
been to clarify that rape and other crimes of sexual violence can constitute
genocide, torture, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. 4 But the
Tribunal has also had occasion to add to the law of the U.N. Charter; one of
its first decisions pronounced on the validity of the Security Council
resolution that gave it life. 5 At the same time, the Tribunal has developed

at
Detainees,
of
List
Glance,
a
at
ICTY
The
2.
See
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
3.
A/CONF. 183/9. The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. As of this writing,
there are 87 parties to the Statute.
See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No.: IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, paras. 546-61, 2
4.
Nov. 2001 (holding that rape can constitute torture); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No.: IT-962 I-T, Judgement, 16 November 1998 (torture); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos.: IT-96-23T & IT-96-23/1- T, Judgement, 22 Feb. 2001 (holding that sexual enslavement can
constitute a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.: IT-95-17/1-T,
Judgement, 10 Dec. 1998, appeal dismissed 21 July 2000 (violations of the laws and
customs of war). The Rwanda Tribunal has made particularly important contributions to the
development of the law on sexual violence. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No.: ICTR-96-4-A,
Judgement, 1 June 2001 (genocide); Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and
Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97
(1999).
The Tribunal Statute does list rape as a crime against humanity, but the Statute's
definitions of war crimes and genocide make no mention of rape or sexual violence. Thus,
as the Tribunal's first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, put it,
It fell to the United Nations tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to
employ concepts such as torture and inhuman treatment in order to issue
indictments against those accused of systematic mass rape in Bosnia and Rwanda.
In was presumably in light of this experience that the Rome Statute for a
permanent international criminal court (ICC) treats the subject of gender- related
crimes appropriately for the first time in the history of modern humanitarian law.
Richard J. Goldstone, Book Review, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 416 (2000) (reviewing THEODOR
MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE (1998)). Indeed, the Rome Statute's definition of
crimes against humanity now covers not only rape but also "sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization" and other "sexual violence," and its
definition of war crimes contains similar provisions. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art.
7(1)(g) and art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
5.
on Jurisdiction, Case No.: IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, paras. 28-
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its own judicial style, a curious hybrid between civil- and common-law
legal systems. In both style and substance, then, the Tribunal has grown
into something unique.
That is not to say that the Tribunal's youth was trouble-free. In its
infancy, the Tribunal interpreted its Statute aggressively, brashly holding
that Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute - which criminalizes violations of
the "laws and customs of war" - applies not just to international armed
conflict, but also to internal armed conflict. 6 Likewise, the young Tribunal
struggled to find its judicial style, leaning toward a civil-law model as it
eschewed plea bargains and permitted prosecutorial appeals of acquittals.
Thankfully, in both style and substance, the Tribunal has achieved more of
a balance over the years. This essay 7 briefly addresses both facets substantive and stylistic - of the Tribunal's development.

The Tribunal's earliest decisions were characterized by a certain amount
of chutzpah.8 One example was the Appeals Chamber's holding in
Prosecutor v. Tadic that the U.N. Security Council had the authority to
establish the ICTY. The Trial Chamber had taken the easy way out,
holding that the Council's authority was a nonjusticiable political question,
though also observing in lengthy dicta that the Council appeared to have
acted reasonably. 9 The Appeals Chamber took a different approach. It
swept aside the justiciability objection in three short paragraphs, quoting
from the opinion of the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses:
It is true that most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations
will have political significance, great or small. In the nature of things it
could not be otherwise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a political
character to a request which invites it to undertake an 0essentially
judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision. '
"This dictum," the Appeals Chamber intoned, "applies almost literally to

48 (1996).
6.
See id., paras. 86-91.

7.

The title of this essay derives from a study of a different jurist's legal evolution.

See generally Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REv. 717

(1983).
8.

As to which, see generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, CHUTZPAH (1991).

9.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No.: IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32,
paras. 21-24 (1996).
10.
Id. at para. 24 (quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J.
Reports 151, at 155 (July 20) (advisory opinion)).
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the present case.""1 Without further explanation, the Chamber declared
that the validity of this exercise of the Security Council's Chapter VII
powers was not a political question. 12 This astonishing lack of analysis
brings to mind Grant Gilmore's crack about the methodology of commonlaw judges applying the doctrine of estoppel: "for reasons which' 13the court
does not care to discuss, there must be judgment for the plaintiff."
In assessing the validity of the Security Council resolution establishing
the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic was more garrulous but no less
audacious. While affirming that the Council has broad discretion to
determine whether there is a threat to the peace under Article 39 of the
Charter, the Appeals Chamber went out of its way to make clear that this
discretion is not absolute:
It is clear from this text that the Security Council plays a pivotal role
and exercises a very wide discretion under this Article. But this does not
mean that its powers are unlimited. The Security Council is an organ of
an international organization, established by a treaty which serves as a
constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is
thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its
powers under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any
case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at
large, not to mention other specific limitations or those which may
derive from the internal division of power within the Organization. In
any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter14conceives of the
Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law).
The Chamber also concluded that it had "incidental jurisdiction" to
review over the Security Council resolution establishing
exercise judicial
15
the Tribunal.
To be sure, the International Court of Justice has also intimated that it
has a power of judicial review over Council resolutions, but in much more
ambiguous and cautious terms. In Certain Expenses, the Court seemed to
reject the notion of judicial review, finding no "procedure" in the "structure
of the United Nations" for assessing the validity of the acts of other organs,
and concluding that those organs must, in the first instance, "determine
[their] own jurisdiction."' 16 Its 1971 Namibia advisory opinion again
11.
12.
13.

Id.
See id., para. 25.
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 64 (1974).

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
14.
Jurisdiction, Case No.: IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, para. 28
(1996).
15.
16.

See id., paras. 21-22.
Certain Expenses, supra note 10, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
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adopted an ambiguous stance, declaring that "[u]ndoubtedly, the Court
does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned," but proceeding
to consider such "objections" anyway "in the course of its reasoning."' 17 In
Libya v. United States, the majority again shied away from exercising a
power of judicial review over a Security Council resolution, but a number
of concurring and dissenting opinions argued that the ICJ should consider
whether the resolution was valid. 18 Thus, the ICJ has been comparatively
reluctant to rule on the constitutional validity of acts of other U.N. organs 19
in my view too reluctant
- and it has never invalidated a resolution of the
20
Council.
Security
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic, by contrast, displayed no such
reluctance; it went on for more than twenty paragraphs on its way to
concluding, unsurprisingly, that the Council had authority under Chapter
VII to establish the Tribunal. Furthermore, it is true that arbitral panels
have often exercised the comptence de la competence to examine the
scope of their own jurisdiction, including sometimes the validity of the
underlying arbitration agreement itself.2 1 As I have argued elsewhere,
however, there is a difference between passing on the validity of a private
arbitration
agreement and passing on a decision of the U.N. Security
22
Council.

17.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (Southwest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16, 45 (June 21).
18.
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 140, 156,
192-93, 196, 174-75 (Provisional Measures Order of April 14) (Shahabuddeen, J.,
concurring) (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting) (Ajibola, J.,
dissenting) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
19.
See Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World
Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-14, 28-43 (1993) (arguing that the drafting history of the
Charter suggests that it did not rule out all forms of judicial review) (arguing for a
"Jeffersonian" model ofjudicial review).
20.
For more on the World Court's power of judicial review, see Marcella David,
Passportto Justice: Internationalizingthe PoliticalQuestion Doctrinefor Application in the
World Court, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81 (1999); Josd E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); Watson, supra note 19; W. Michael Reisman, The
Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993); Thomas M.
Franck, The "Powers of "Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992).
21.
See generally IBRAHIM F.1. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
TO DETERMINE ITS OWN JURISDICTION; COMPETENCE DE LA COMPETENCE (1965).
22.
Geoffrey R. Watson, The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal: Jurisdictionin Prosecutor v. Tadic, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 703 (1996) ("it is one
thing to say that an arbitral panel may rule on its own jurisdiction and perhaps on the
validity of an arbitration agreement between private parties; it is quite another to say that a
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I'm not suggesting that the Appeals Chamber reached the wrong result,
or even that it should have refrained from examining the Council
resolution; but I am suggesting that the tone and length of the Chamber's
opinion adds up to a much more aggressive approach than the World
Court's own jurisprudence on the same subject. The Appeals Chamber
wrote as if it were for the Tribunal to lead the way, when one might expect
it to be the other way around; it is the ICJ, of course, that is the "principal
judicial organ" of the United Nations. 2 3 Of course, there is precedent for a
dialogue between U.N. organs and other subsidiary bodies in international
law. As David Bederman points out, for example, there has been a
productive "feed-back loop" between the International Law Commission
and the ICJ, as when the ICJ made use of the draft rules on state
24
responsibility in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject,
and the ILC later made use of the ICJ's interpretation of the rules in its
final draft of the rules. 25 And indeed, the ICJ has started to take note of
ICTY precedent. 26 But the ICTY's early attitude toward the ICJ seemed to
be more one of indifference or even disregard.
This attitude was especially apparent in the Appeals Chamber's 1997
judgment in Tadic.27 The court had to decide whether there had been an
international armed conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina, and in particular
whether the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

subsidiary organ may pass on the validity of a resolution of the U.N. Security Council, the
'top dog' in international law.").
23.

U.N. CHARTER, art. 92.

24.
(Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 56 (Sept. 25) (requiring that
countermeasures be, among other things, "commensurate" with the original wrong).
25.
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc (last visited Mar. 28, 2003), reprintedin JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION,

TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002), art. 51 (adopting the "commensurate" test); David J.
Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 821-22 (2002)
(discussing the ICJ's role in the evolution of draft Article 51) (citing Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. REP. 7 (Sept. 25).
See, e.g., Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v.
26.
Belgium), Request for Provisional Measures (Dec. 8, 2000), Declaration Of Judge Van Den
Wyngaert, 2000 I.C.J. REP. 182, 232 & n.15 (noting that several decisions of the ICTY and
the Rwanda Tribunal tend to support the proposition that "there is a right and even a duty on
States to prosecute" the most serious "core crimes" in international, such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
27.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, No.: IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, Judgement 7 May 1997,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997). For a useful contemporaneous analysis of the holding,
see generally Michael P. Scharf, InternationalDecisions, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 718 (1997).
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Herzegovina/Republika Srpska ("VRS") was sufficiently linked to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia so as to establish an international conflict.
Like the Trial Chamber before it, the Appeals Chamber found it useful to
resort to the ICJ's holding, in Nicaraguav. United States, that a state could
incur international responsibility if it exercised a certain degree of control
("effective control," the Court said at one point) over armed rebels fighting
another state. 2 8 It is surprising enough that the ICTY found that Nicaragua
was so central to the issue in Tadic; the question of Yugoslavia's
responsibility was not at issue in Tadic. As Professor (now Judge) Meron
put it: "[C]onsider a conflict in a country where practically all the fighting
is done by a foreign state, but where the rebels maintain their independence
from the intervening power and do not satisfy the Nicaragua test. Could
29
anyone seriously question the international character of such a conflict?
Still, there is at the very least an analogy between imputation of state
whether an armed conflict is
responsibility, at issue in Nicaragua, and
30
international or internal, at issue in Tadic.
But what's most interesting for my purposes is what the Appeals
Chamber said next: "The Appeals Chamber, with respect, does not hold the
Nicaraguatest to be persuasive." 3 1 At the ripe old age of six, in a case not
28.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 62, 64-65 para. 109 (June 27) (requiring a certain degree of
"dependence on the one side and control on the other"); id. (finding "no clear evidence of
the United States having actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify
treating the contras as acting on its behalf'); id, para. 115 (requiring "effective control").
Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia:
29.
Nicaragua's Fallout,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236, 241 (1998). Cf also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No.: IT/32/Rev. 10, Trial Chamber, Judgement, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
McDonald, 7 May 1997, para. 34 reprinted in 186 I.C.M. 908, 979 (concluding that the
conflict was international even under an "effective control" test, and that in any case the test
"is not a necessary element for a finding of an agency relationship.").
Or, as the commentary to the ILC rules on state responsibility put it, "The
Tribunal's mandate is directed to issues of individual criminal responsibility, not State
responsibility, and the question in [Tadic] concerned not responsibility but the applicable
rules of international humanitarian law." Commentaries to the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law
Comm'n at its 53d sess. (2001), at 106-07, in Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its Fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth
session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10, chp.IV.E.2). Indeed, the provisions on attribution in
the ILC rules do not address the characterization of an armed conflict as international or
internal.
Cf Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM.
30.
J.INT'L L. 905 (2002) (drawing on state responsibility doctrine in the course of analyzing
the modem law of self-defense).
31.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, No.: IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, Judgement 7 May 1997,
para. 115.
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involving state responsibility, the ICTY declared "unpersuasive" a
significant component of a leading World Court decision on state
responsibility in connection with the use of military force! To be sure, ICJ
decisions are binding only on the parties, 3 2 and a robust dialogue between
international institutions is generally welcome. 33 Still, the ICTY's
boldness is striking, all the more so given that some of its criticism of
Nicaragua seems overdrawn. The Appeals Chamber attacked the
Nicaragua test on the grounds that the requisite standard of control should
"vary" according to the circumstances of the case. 34 But the Nicaragua
decision does not advocate a single, rigid standard; it speaks variously of
"control and dependency," a certain "degree of control," and "effective
control."
The Appeals Chamber nonetheless plunged ahead, next
criticizing the ICJ's test as "at variance with international judicial and State
practice" requiring only "a lower degree of control. '35 Again, this criticism
presupposes that Nicaragua fixed an "exclusive" and "all-embracing" test,
as the Chamber insisted; in fact, Nicaragua might fairly be criticized for
the opposite - for waffling on precisely what the test is.
Even as it pronounced on the validity and wisdom of Security Council
Resolutions and World Court decisions, the young International Criminal
Tribunal also adopted a generally broad view of its own jurisdiction. In his
report accompanying the Tribunal's Statute, the U.N. Secretary-General
cautioned that because the Statute would apply retroactively, it should
include only those provisions of humanitarian law that had "beyond any
doubt" passed into customary international law, so as not to offend the
principle nullum crimen sine lege.3 6 But in the jurisdiction phase of Tadic,
the Appeals Chamber held that Article 3 of the Statute - which covers
"violations of the laws or customs of war" - applied not only to
international armed conflict, but also to internal armed conflict. 37 Indeed,
the Tribunal went further, holding that Article 3 operates as a residual

32.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, Art. 59 (1945).

33.

See Remarks of RichardBilder, 96 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC. OF INT'L L. 369,

373 (Mar. 16, 2002) (suggesting that disagreement and discourse between international
tribunals may be a "good thing"); cf Bederman, supra note 25, at 819 (describing a
"feedback loop" between the ILC and the ICJ).
34.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No.: IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, Judgement 7 May
1997, para. 117.
35.
Id, para. 124.
36.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 34; 32 I.L.M. 1163. 11702

(1993).
37.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32,
para. 137 (1996).
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clause, covering "all serious violations" of humanitarian law not covered
elsewhere in the Statute. 38 It is right and good that humanitarian law
extend to internal conflict; but it is a more difficult question whether state
practice has "beyond any doubt" extended that law to civil war. The ICTY
cited no case of a war-crimes prosecution, under either the Hague
Regulations or Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, arising
out of a civil war. To be sure, Tadic was on notice that his conduct was
criminal; but ex postfacto doctrine is designed not only to give the accused
notice, but also to prevent arbitrary use of power by government - to
"ensure that the sovereign will govern impartially and that it will be
39
perceived as doing so."
In some of its early decisions on substantive criminal law, too, the
Tribunal staked out an aggressive - or at least pro-prosecution - posture.
In Prosecutorv. Erdemovic (1997), a 3-2 majority of the Appeals Chamber
held (over vigorous dissent) that duress could not be a complete defense to
homicides that constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes. 40 The
majority acknowledged that national legal systems take different
approaches to the question, and in particular that civil-law systems tend to
permit a duress defense, but the court rested its conclusion on "our
mandated obligation under the Statute to ensure that international
humanitarian law, which is concerned with the protection of humankind, is
not in any way undermined.",4 1 Similarly, the ICTY has taken a relaxed
view of the mens rea of complicity, holding that it suffices for the
Prosecution to prove knowledge of the principal's planned acts, not to
42
show that the accomplice also shared the principal's illicit purpose.
Id., para. 92. In the same decision, interestingly, the Tribunal construed Article 2
38.
- on grave breaches of the Geneva Convention - as applying only in international armed
conflict. See Watson, supra note 23, at 709 (approving this holding); -but cf Sean D.
Murphy, Progress andJurisprudence of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former

Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 68-70 (1999) (suggesting that, rather than construing
Article 3 too broadly, the Chamber interpreted Article 2 too narrowly).
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 307-08 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
39.
Watson, supra note 23, at 717-18; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of
Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent
Protections in NationalConstitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 290-91 (1993).

Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No.: IT-96-22, Judgement, 7 Oct. 1997, para. 19;
40.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No.: IT-96-22, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah, 7 Oct. 1997, paras. 32-89. For the dissenting opinions, see Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Case No.: IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 7 Oct.
1997; id, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 7 Oct. 1997.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
41.
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 32,
para. 88.
See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.: IT-95-17/1, Judgement, 10 Dec. 1998,
42.
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Again, these decisions may be correct, but they all point toward an
expansive view of the prosecution's (and the court's) powers.
Has the Tribunal's aggressiveness been justified? Certainly the Tribunal
has managed to silence some of the critics who initially dismissed it as a
cynical cover for the international community's failure to take effective
action in the former Yugoslavia. 43 The ICTY's fulsome, self-assured
jurisprudence might have helped establish itself as a serious international
institution. But the ICTY's bluster might have also damaged its credibility.
Despite the busy proceedings in the Hague, violations of international
humanitarian law proceeded apace in the former Yugoslavia, leading some
to argue that the ICTY has not deterred crime. 44 Consider also the
experience of an institution like the European Court of Human Rights,
which adopted a cautious approach to its own jurisdiction and authority in
its early years. In its formative years, the European Court did not
automatically jump to find a state in violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights in any given case, and the Court gained respect because
of its perceived willingness to hear both sides. 4 5 As a result, the European
Court is now "unique among international bodies because it routinely
imposes sanctions
on governments for violating the human rights of their
' A6
nationals.
There are signs that the ICTY's jurisprudence is changing, that it is
starting to resemble that of its more restrained colleague in Strasbourg. In

paras. 236-49; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No.: IT-95-14/1, Judgement, 24 Mar. 2000,
para. 162; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No.: IT-96-23, Judgement, 22 Feb. 2001, para. 392;
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No.: IT-98-32, Judgement, 29 Nov. 2002, para. 71.
43.
Cf David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and ForeseeableShortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD

AFF. 7, 7-8 (Fall 2002) (asserting that "the ICTY's achievements have exceeded the boldest
hopes of its creators" and that its "rise to international significance has defied [its] critics").
44.
See, e.g., Paul Williams, Why the Tribunal has Failed to Deter International
Crime, Remarks at The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the
International Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade; Col. Michael Newton, Should the
United States Join the InternationalCriminal Court, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 42

(2002) ("As far as I saw, the ICTY existence and its jurisdiction had no deterrent effect
whatsoever on Milosevic").
45.
Cf Richard S. Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the
Authority of Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 217,220 (1993) (asserting that the European Court has
"earned acceptance" as the "authoritative interpreter of binding legal rules"); id. at 223-24
(urging a cautious approach to expansion of the human rights regime to the new
democracies of Central Europe). Cf Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15
CONN. J. INT'L L. 39, 44-45 (2000) (commenting on the European Court's "increasing"
legitimacy).
46.

FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,

POLICY, AND PROCESS 481 (1996).
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general, the ICTY seems to have grown more sensitive to the rights of the
accused - rights that are guaranteed in human rights law. One example is
the Tribunal's greater willingness to permit provisional release of
defendants pending trial. Initially the Tribunal was very reluctant to permit
release, fearing that the accused would flee. The Trial Chamber's original
version of Rule 65(B), the rule governing provisional release, placed a
heavy burden on the defendant to justify release to demonstrate that the
defendant would not flee, posed no danger to others, and - most
notoriously - that there were "exceptional circumstances" justifying
provisional release. Under this standard, only four defendants obtained
provisional release.4 7 In 1999 the Tribunal's Rules Committee amended
requirement that the defendant show
this rule by removing the
"exceptional-circumstances." 48 This change followed the death of two
defendants who had been in custody while awaiting trial. According to
Judge Wald, the judges of the ICTY became concerned about the
"depressive effects" of prolonged pretrial detention.4 9 Those effects could
be especially troubling at the ICTY, whose trials have been notoriously
long and drawn-out. The new, more relaxed rule on provisional release
seems more consistent with human rights law, which holds that "it shall not
be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody."5 0 Thanks to the rule change, the Tribunal's practice on pretrial
release has relaxed - a little. At this writing, eleven defendants are on
release, awaiting trial.
The Tribunal's growing receptivity to plea-bargaining is another

See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No.: IT-95-14/2-T, Order on Motion of
47.
the Accused Mario Cerkez for Provisional Release, 14 Sept. 1999; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
Case No.: IT-95-16-T, Decision on the Motion of Defense Counsel for Drago Josipovic, 9
May 1999; Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No.: IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Provisional Release of
the Accused, 26 Mar. 1998; Prosecutor v. Dukic, Case No. IT-96-20-T, Decision Rejecting
the Application to Withdraw the Indictment and Order for Provisional Release, Trial 24
Apr. 1996.
48.
See generally Matthew M. DeFrank, Note, ICTY Provisional Release: Current
Practice,a Dissenting Voice, and the Casefor a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 143031(2002).
Patricia Wald & Jenny Martinez, Provisional Release at the ICTY: A Work in
49.
Progress,in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
McDONALD 233 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
50.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9(3), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 175. The Covenant adds, however, that release "may be subject to guarantees

to appear for trial." Id. Cf also id., Art. 14(2) at 176 ("Everyone charged with a criminal
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by law"); Universal
Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ii), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (declaring a
presumption of innocence).
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"signpost on the road ' 5 1 to a more balanced jurisprudence. The Statute of
the Tribunal contains no provision explicitly authorizing plea-bargaining,
and the ICTY initially omitted any authorization for plea-bargaining from
its own rules. 52 In this, as in other things, the early ICTY leaned more
toward civil-law than common-law practice. But the ICTY slowly has
come to embrace plea-bargaining as a necessary component of a court with
a heavy workload and a complex body of governing law. 53 The ICTY has
been willing not just to entertain guilty pleas, but also to convict in
accordance with plea agreements between the prosecution
and the defense,
54
a practice recently formalized in new Rule 62-ter.
Overall, the development of plea-bargaining at the ICTY has been a
good thing. Plea bargaining has encouraged defendants to cooperate with
the Tribunal on cases against other defendants, and has not resulted in
outrageously lenient sentences. 55 There is justifiable concern that the
ICTY's process for plea-bargaining needs improvement to ensure that

51.
Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173,
175 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J.) (speaking of "signposts on the road" to the adoption of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel).
52.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No.: IT-96-22-T, Judgement, Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 7 Oct. 1997, para. 10.
53.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No.: IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgement,
5 Mar. 1998, paras. 8-11 (convicting a defendant on the basis of a guilty plea); Prosecutor v.
Jelisic, Case No.: IT-95-10, Judgement, 14 Dec. 1999, paras. 127, 138 (convicting in
accordance with a guilty plea, but according the plea relatively little weight in sentencing);
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No.: IT-95-10, Judgement, 5 July 2001 (affirming most but not
all findings of guilt below, and affirming the 40-year sentence); Prosecutor v. Todorovic,
Case No.: IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgement, 31 July 2001, paras. 7-17 (convicting a
defendant in accordance with a plea agreement); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No.: IT-95-8,
Sentencing Judgement, 13 Nov. 2001, paras. 17-39 (convicting in accordance with plea
agreements); Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No.: IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 17 Oct.
2002, paras. 9-23 (convicting in accordance with a plea agreement).
ICTY Rule 62-bis permits (but does not require) the Trial Chamber to convict
based on a "voluntary," unequivocal guilty plea that is supported by a "sufficient factual
basis." ICTY Rules of Procedureand Evidence, U.N. Doc.: IT/32/Rev.24, 11 and 12 July
2002, Rule 62-bis. See generally Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The
Plea Bargainingof InternationalCrimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 107-26 (2002) (tracing the
development of the ICTY's practice in accepting guilty pleas); Michael Bohlander, Plea
Bargaining Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE INHONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 151 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
54.
Rule 62-ter, entitled "Plea Agreement Procedure," provides that the prosecution
and defense "may" agree that the accused will plead guilty and that the prosecutor "shall"
apply to amend the indictment, or recommend (or not object to) a sentence or sentencing
range. Section (B) of the rule also provides that the Trial Chamber "shall not be bound" by
any such agreement.
55.
See Coombs, supra note 53, at 147-48.
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guilty pleas are made knowingly and without coercion, 5 6 but the Tribunal's
requirement of full disclosure of evidence to the defense - like the
requirement that the trial court find that the plea is voluntary
and supported
57
extent.
fair
a
to
concern
this
ameliorates
by evidence
The Tribunal has also moved toward a more "common-law style" in
another area: the consideration and exclusion of evidence. The ICTY has
from time to time claimed that it adheres neither to the civil-law approach,
which favors admissibility of all relevant evidence, including hearsay, and
the common-law approach, which imposes stricter limits on the
introduction of evidence in general and hearsay in particular. As one Trial
Chamber put it,
neither the rules issuing from the common law tradition in respect of the
admissibility of hearsay evidence nor the general principle prevailing in
the civil law systems, according to which, barring exceptions, all
relevant evidence is admissible, including hearsay evidence, because it
is the judge who finally takes a decision on the weight to ascribe to it,
are directly applicable before this Tribunal. The International Tribunal
is, in fact, a sui generis institution with its own rules of procedure which
do not merely constitute a transposition of national legal systems. The
same holds for the conduct of the trial which, contrary to the Defence
arguments, is not similar
to an adversarial trial, but is moving towards a
58
more hybrid system.
In practice, as Sean Murphy has observed, "the trial chambers have
shown
59
little tendency to exclude evidence, including hearsay evidence."
As with plea-bargaining, the Tribunal's approach to evidence is
changing. Whereas the Tadic trial mired itself in hours of oral testimony
about the history of the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY is now more apt to
rely on written summaries of such testimony by using techniques such as
judicial notice and written stipulation. 60 While some ICTY trials continue
to take several years, generally ICTY proceedings are becoming more
efficient. Since ICTY judges serve as the triers of fact, it is unlikely that
the ICTY will ever exclude evidence as ruthlessly as common-law judges
56.
See Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic SentencingJudgement: A Questionable Milestone
for the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 26 GA. J.INT'L & COMP.

L. 263, 268-69 (1997).
57.
See Coombs, supra note 53, at 147.
58.
Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 80 (1999) (citing Prosecutor v.

Blaskic, Case No.: IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on the standing objection of the
Defence to the admission of hearsay with no inquiry as to its reliability (Jan. 1998)).
59.
Murphy, supra note 58, at 80.
60.
See ICTY Rule 94 (judicial notice) & 94-bis (written agreement of the parties);
Murphy, supra note 58, at 81.
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do, but at least there are indications that the ICTY is sensitive to the need to
streamline its proceedings. As the ICTY has acknowledged, the ICTY
law generally, requires that the accused "be tried
statute, like human rights
61
without undue delay."
It is harder to generalize about the direction of the ICTY's substantive
jurisprudence. The Tribunal has not recently had occasion to pass on the
validity of any Security Council resolutions, but it still seems quite willing
to take on the ICJ. Presented with a chance to reconsider its holding that
Nicaragua is "unpersuasive," the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski (2000) reaffirmed its earlier decision, finding no "cogent
reason" to alter its view. 62 More recently, in the Celebici case (2001), the
Appeals Chamber acknowledged that it "cannot behave as if the general
state of the law in the international community whose interests it serves is
none of its concern." 6 3 Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber once again
sustained its earlier holding that the ICJ was wrong in Nicaragua,64 and the
Chamber rejected any notion that the ICTY occupies a lower rung on the
ladder of international law than the ICJ:
[T]his Tribunal is an autonomous international judicial body, and
although the ICJ is the "principal judicial organ" within the United
Nations system to which the Tribunal belongs, there is no hierarchical
relationship between the two courts. Although the Appeals Chamber
will necessarily take into consideration other decisions of international
courts, it 65
may, after careful consideration, come to a different
conclusion.

Thus the Tribunal has not lost all its chutzpah. In the end, this aspect of
the Tribunal's jurisprudence is welcome. To be sure, international law
already suffers from a surfeit of conflicting rules and institutions. But it's
hard to see any practical downside to the ICTY's declaration of judicial
61.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal, Art. 21(4)(c); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 14(3)(c). See Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, No.: IT97-24, Trial Chamber, Decision on Prosecutor's Request to File an Amended Indictment,
5 Mar. 1998, paras. 8, 12 (refusing prosecutor's request to file an amended indictment,
partly on speedy trial grounds).
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, No.: IT-95-14/1, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 24 Mar.
62.
2000, para. 134 (reaffirming the "overall control" test of Tadic). See also Prosecutor v.
Kordic, No.: IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 26 Feb. 2001, paras. 112-13 (applying
the "overall control" test).
Prosecutor v. Delalic, No.: IT-96-21, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 20 Feb. 2001
63.
para. 24 (quoting Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, appended to Decision, Le
Procureurv. Laurent Semanza, ICTR, Case No.: ICTR-97-20-A, App. Ch., 31 May 2000,

para. 25).
See id., paras. 10-27.
64.
65.
Id., para. 24 (footnotes omitted).
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independence, and there's an obvious upside: the enrichment of
international legal discourse. I have argued elsewhere against the notion
that the ICJ should enjoy judicial supremacy along the lines of a domestic
constitutional court. Instead I have argued for a "Jeffersonian" model of
judicial review, in which the Court's decisions can rest alongside other,
competing views. 66 The ICTY's approach to Nicaraguais consistent with
this approach. If the ICTY is wrong about Nicaragua, its opinion will be
rejected by other international tribunals, such as the International Criminal
Court and the ICJ itself, and in the fullness of time the issue will sort itself
out. And if the ICTY is right, then so much the better.

Thus the ICTY heads into its second decade with a judicial style that is
gradually growing more balanced. It has loosened its restrictions on
pretrial detention, embraced plea-bargaining, placed some restraints on the
presentation of evidence, and sped up its trial process. At the same time, it
has provided generally fair trials, and those trials have resulted in an
impressive array of convictions for crimes of staggering violence, including
crimes of sexual violence. On the whole, the ICTY has had a pretty good
first ten years.
At this symposium on "ICTY at Ten," so graciously hosted by the New
England School of Law, I wondered aloud whether one day we might be
celebrating a fiftieth birthday for the ICTY. Yes, Tribunal officials have
said that the Tribunal will wrap up its work in a few more years, but the
ICTY's Statute is not time-limited; it covers international crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia "since" 1991.67 Still, there is a new
International Criminal Court preparing to take the reins, and for now an
uneasy peace stretches across the former Yugoslavia. We all certainly
hope that there will be no new mass atrocities for the Tribunal to
adjudicate, and thus that the Tribunal will eventually run out of things to
adjudicate. Accordingly, we find ourselves in the peculiar position of
hoping for the demise of the thing whose birthday we now celebrate.
But I don't want to end on that rather discordant note. Consider this
instead: the Tribunal was only two years old when it passed judgment on its
creator, the U.N. Security Council. At age four, the Tribunal took on its
aging cousin, the International Court of Justice. Imagine what kind of
trouble the Tribunal might dig up in its teenage years!

66.
67.

See Watson, supra note 19, at 39-43.
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal, Art. 1.

